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Abstract—Mobile databases are the statutory backbones of
many applications on smartphones, and they store a lot of
sensitive information. However, vulnerabilities in the operating
system or the app logic can lead to sensitive data leakage by
giving the adversaries unauthorized access to the apps database.
In this paper, we study such vulnerabilities to define a threat
model, and we propose an OS-version independent protection
mechanism that app developers can utilize to detect such attacks.
To do so, we model the user behavior with the database query
workload created by the original apps. Here, we model the
drift in behavior by comparing probability distributions of the
query workload features over time. We then use this model to
determine if the app behavior drift is anomalous. We evaluate our
framework on real-world workloads of three different popular
Android apps, and we show that our system was able to detect
more than 90% of such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Google Android OS usage has grown substantially over the
past years and reached 85% of the market share in smartphones
by the first quarter of 2017 [1]. Unlike its competitors, Android
OS is open source, and used by many hardware vendors on
their smartphones. However, this flexibility comes with the
cost of hardware interface (a.k.a. firmware) development by
the vendors. This results in some smartphone models getting
out-of-date, and not supported by the new versions of the
Android OS, hence, not being able to get the latest security
updates. Based on this limitation, application (app) developers
may need to employ their own defense mechanisms if their
apps get affected by vulnerabilities. Apps can release new
versions for each Android version even though the OS support
is terminated.
On smartphones, both the operating system and the apps
contain a lot of sensitive information that is subject to various
threats [2], [3], [4], [5]. Some of these threats exploit vul-
nerabilities in the OS, or take advantage of the flexible app
development capabilities of Android which expose the access
credentials of databases dedicated to the apps. Our solution
targets apps that store sensitive information in their databases,
and it is based on monitoring database access activity of the
users [6]. This approach provides a flexible solution that can
be employed by the apps themselves, the database system, or
the operating system. It enables monitoring unusual activity,
and take action against potential threats. The advantage is to
be able to observe all, including permissible, activity. Since a
smartphone is essentially designed to be a personal device, the
underlying database is designed to be owned and used only
by the app. Android database security features are designed to
prevent all other users except the app itself to use the database.
We can employ the monitoring mechanism to depend on
detecting anomalies in the app’s database usage. The basic
pathway for a common monitoring mechanism is to: (1) extract
relevant features that reflect the user behavior, (2) cluster
similar actions, and (3) find outlier actions, which appear to be
a very effective approach [7]. However, attacks exploiting vul-
nerabilities can use the app’s query generator to create queries,
which would result in issuing the same query templates to
the database, therefore, these queries cannot be considered as
outliers with this method. Furthermore, smartphone apps can
change over time with small modifications such as updates,
and force the users to accomplish the same task in a different
way [8]. Also, the users can get more proficient with the use
of app in time, or their interests can shift over time. Both of
these cases would require the deployed security mechanisms
to adapt to the change.
Scenario. Let us consider a photographer (let’s call him
Jason) using Instagram profile as a portfolio. During the
first month of the account opening, he aggressively posts his
existing photographs, and builds a portfolio. He then uses the
Instagram profile to answer the questions, and communicate
with the potential customers. A few weeks later, Instagram
introduces a new feature called “Story”, which enables users
to post short videos and pictures that disappear automatically
after 24 hours. Considering taking quality photographs that
attract customers takes time and energy, he less frequently
posts photos, and he starts to post stories while on the job, to
keep the interest of his followers.
Jason’s activity results in Instagram web services to query
the database in three different areas of the database: (1)
Permanent photo storage, (2) Messaging storage, and (3)
Story storage. However, in the first month, his activity con-
stitutes mostly inserting to the permanent photo storage, and
increasing read and write access to the messaging storage.
After that time period, the queries generated for his activity
target mostly inserting to and deleting from the story storage
while maintaining a similar workload on messaging, and less
frequently generating insert queries to the permanent photo
storage. Although both of these behavior shifts are expected,
the shifts from normal profile activity can be identified as an
outlier if the monitoring system is not designed to adapt to
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the changes, resulting in increased false positives.
A work-around for this problem could be re-training with
more recent data when the system starts to return false pos-
itives. However, an adaptive system can tolerate this change,
therefore, reduce false positives, and eliminate the need for
retraining. We observe that various experiments reported in
the literature do not consider the changes that happen over
time, and the synthetic datasets used for the experiments do
not reflect any behavior changes.
In this paper, we bridge this gap by constructing a user
behavior model which explicitly models temporal behavior
drift. We focus on detecting data breaches against an app’s
database to scope down the problem. In our experiments,
we utilize real-world query logs of three different apps to
understand the behavior drift, and validate the effectiveness
of our proposed system.
To identify the behavior drift, and determine if there is a
possible data leakage in a user’s workload, we define four
basic steps. We first observe and process every SQL query
issued to the DBMS. We extract the relevant features of
the query considering which part of the database the user is
accessing with that particular query. Second, we construct user
profiles by accumulating the extracted features for each user
for a given period of time. The distribution of the features
harvested from these queries constitutes a user profile. Third,
we identify the constant drift in behavior by observing the
changes in the distribution of features the users utilize. Lastly,
we analyze the behavior change, and determine outliers by
detecting drastic changes in the drift. Namely, we consider
the temporal behavior drift of each user to set an adaptive
threshold.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are: (1) Building
a threat model that leads to sensitive data leakage from
smartphones, (2) Introducing behavioral drift in user activity,
and (3) Providing a defense strategy against the modeled
threat. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first study that uses a large real–world SQL query trace
to validate the results.
This paper is organized as follows. we start by introducing
our system Query Workload Auditor (QWA) and the threat
model it addresses in Section II. We then explain the tech-
niques that we use to create user profiles in Section III.
Section IV presents the experiments performed to show the
effectiveness of the system, and we discuss the shortcomings
and potential improvements over the proposed system in
Section VI. We present the related work in Section V and
discuss our work in Section VI. Finally, we conclude and
discuss our plans to improve our system in Section VII.
II. QWA
Query Workload Auditor (QWA) aims to provide a fix to
the vulnerabilities that can lead to data leakage from the app’s
database, using the data access patterns of each specific app.
In this section, we first discuss recent vulnerabilities that can
cause the described threat in Section II-A, the threat model we
address in Section II-B, and the architecture of the described
system in Section II-C.
A. Vulnerabilities
There are a number of vulnerabilities in the Android OS
reported in the literature, most of which are fixed [9], [10]. In
this paper, we focus on recent vulnerabilities reported which
can allow attackers to steal sensitive information from the
app’s database.
Janus Vulnerability. Android Application Package (APK)
file format is used to distribute Android apps. It is essentially
a compressed ZIP file that is structured to be recognized as an
app distribution package by Android OS. Dalvik Executable
(DEX) files, on the other hand, are binary files, and they
contain the compiled code. An APK file includes compiled
program classes in DEX format.
A vulnerability called Janus in some certain versions of
the Android OS allows attackers to create a modified APK
file from a legitimate APK and a malicious DEX file without
changing the app signature as shown in Figure 1. The modified
APK file is then recognized as a legitimate app, and can be
installed to the device.
Fig. 1: Embedding DEX into APK files
This vulnerability affects apps running on devices with
Android 5.0 to Android 7.0 and signed with APK signature
scheme v1 [11]. A security firm reported the issue, and
Google released a patch in November 2017 to prevent this
vulnerability to affect new devices that have Android 7.0 and
newer OS. However, older devices and apps that have not been
signed with APK signature scheme v2 still remain at risk.
Database Vulnerabilities. Android databases are usually
controlled by content providers. They are configured in An-
droidManifest.xml which is a configuration file and is present
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in every app. Generally, the database of each app is private and
do not allow access from other apps. However, it is possible
to configure the content provider to permit other apps to
query the database as seen in Figure 2. It is also possible
to access databases through calling database instance directly
from within the app. In this case, the database is definitely
unique to the app, and the database cannot be shared with
other apps.
A simple configuration error such as unintentionally setting
exported=true can open up the content provider to the
use of other apps and service requests. ContentScope [12]
reports that out of 62,519 apps they have surveyed, 2,150 apps
had their content providers exposed. Of course, it is possible
for some apps to allow access to their content providers.
However, it is also possible that the app developers used an
example code they found on a website like stackoverflow.com.
DBDroidScanner [3] identifies further vulnerabilities in the
content providers, and alternative ways of creating SQLite
databases within apps. Furthermore, some of the apps keep
data stored in the database in plain text, and subject to
synchronization manipulation [13].
Fig. 2: Content Provider access
Attack vector. One of the threats Janus vulnerability poses
is embedding a DEX file that accesses the app database that
contains sensitive information. If the injected code does not
change any other function, and just focuses on stealing data,
the app will still function normally, and the users will not be
aware of their information being stolen. However, it is also
possible for the injected code to tamper with the database
contents, hence affecting what the user does and sees, and
changing the app behavior.
The content provider and SQLite interfaces provide access
to the database, and makes it possible for the attackers to issue
raw SQL queries to the app’s database. Again, since the app
itself is benign, and has not been changed, it is possible for
any user to be subject to these attacks.
B. Threat Model
Janus is a vulnerability that originates from how Android
validates if an APK file is legitimate. It injects malicious code
into the app by adding binary code to the original file. The
malicious code runs alongside the app, where it can perform
a number of activities such as accessing the database to steal
information. Janus is not the first vulnerability that had similar
repercussions – HTML5-based apps had been a target for code
injection attacks [14] along with other web-to-app attacks [15].
Content provider vulnerabilities, on the other hand, expose
directly the data access layer of an app to the attackers, and the
DBDroidScanner [3] reports that the number of vulnerabilities
and vulnerable apps are growing.
Our system aims to detect attacks that originate from
known and unknown vulnerabilities that expose the sensitive
information in the database to attackers. We target attacks that
query the database to glean sensitive information, and tamper
database records as a result of vulnerability types presented
above. These attacks can behave and affect the workload in
three different ways:
Copycat attack model. The workload created by the app
stays unaffected, the malicious code creates an additional
workload with its own query generation strategy.
Free-styler attack model. The workload created by the
app stays unaffected, the malicious code creates an additional
workload with the app’s query generation strategy.
Translator attack model. The workload created by the app
gets affected by malicious code through the overridden classes
and information flow changes. This model can be subdivided
into two categories: (1) The malicious code modifies the
query generation strategy to easily extract information required
by the attackers, and (2) The malicious code modifies the
information flow which results in the app generating legitimate
queries for actions that do not require them.
C. Architecture
QWA is designed to be modular and flexible, in order
to be able to integrate with the other OS security features,
apps and various databases. If it is implemented in the OS
layer as an extension to the default ContentProvider
as shown in Figure 3a, after it is active and running, any
app that interacts with the database can be monitored. Also,
it can be integrated into any app just to observe the query
traffic so that it does not bring timing overhead to the query
processing. If it is integrated between the application logic and
the ContentProvider as shown in Figure 3b, it acts as a
mediator between the app and the ContentProvider. It
is also possible to extend the ContentProvider within
the app by inheriting the ContentProvider class, and
overriding its methods.
When a user uses an app on their device through the app
graphical user interface (GUI), the app generates queries, and
issues them to the database. The database is contained in a
database server instance running on the device. QWA just
observes the queries that are issued to the database, and it
does not block or change the queries. Any query that is issued
to the database is captured by the QWA, processed, and logged
there, and then sent to the database. Although QWA does not
block any queries, it detects suspicious activity, and reports
them. The overview of the system architecture is depicted in
Figure 3 where QWA acts as the observer in the system.
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(a) QWA as an extension to the Content Provider
(b) QWA as a Mediator
Fig. 3: Architecture
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our user behavior modeling
methodology, and the anomaly detection strategy.
A. SQL Query Feature Extraction
A relational database is a set of relations (i.e., tables), and
a relation is a bag of tuples (i.e., rows) where a tuple is a
structured data item. The structure is defined with attributes
(i.e., columns) and the types of the attributes.
Structured Query Language (SQL) is a declarative language
that is designed for managing, manipulating, and retrieving
from relational databases. Other than schema manipulation and
data access control operations, SQL queries mainly perform
4 different operations: (1) insert, (2) update, (3) delete, and
(4) select. The basic structure of these operations are given
respectively:
(1) INSERT INTO table (column1, column2, ...)
VALUES (value1, value2, ...);
(2) UPDATE table
SET column1 = integer|decimal|string|...
WHERE column2 = integer|decimal|string|...
(3) DELETE FROM table
WHERE column1 = integer|decimal|string|...
(4) SELECT [aggregation] column1, column2, ...
FROM table1, table2
[WHERE table1.column1 = table2.column3]
[ORDER BY column1] [GROUP BY column1]
[LIMIT integer]
where the brackets show optional query items. As can
be implied from these basic structures, queries that perform
similar tasks usually have analogous structures, or at least
share some attributes. SQL query statements are constructed
from clauses. Every line of the query structures given above
constitutes a clause. As an example let’s take the following
query which reads as “Show the names and number of games
played for each player who is over 30”:
(1) SELECT p.name, COUNT(g.played)
(2) FROM player p, game g
(3) WHERE p.id = g.playerid AND p.age > 30
(4) GROUP BY u.name
(5) ORDER BY u.name
Line 1 consists of the SELECT keyword, and the projection
items. Line 2 has the FROM clause which lists the tables the
query is going to use. Line 3 is named the WHERE clause.
WHERE clause contains selection and join expressions. p.id
= g.playerid expression is a join expression, and p.age
> 30 is a selection expression. Line 4 and 5 include the
group-by and order-by items, respectively.
Query interpretation, namely, understanding the goal of
the query, is regarded as hard as creating a new query, and
even more so for complex queries [16]. Furthermore, complex
queries are not uncommon due to the expressive nature of
the SQL. The databases are designed and optimized for
performance and correctness, which requires simple relations.
Hence, the queries need to be designed more complex with
high numbers of table joins as the need increases to access
complex information. There is a line of research that aims to
capture user intention through queries since it would contribute
to security applications [17], automated personalized query
generation [18], and interest mining [19]. To accomplish this,
it is essential to identify the required features to be extracted
from the SQL queries. As mentioned before, the data stored
in the database can also be a good indicator for measuring
the similarity of the queries [20]. For instance, consider the
following query:
(1) SELECT * FROM contact
WHERE name LIKE "A%"
(2) SELECT * FROM contact
The first query reads as “list all contacts whose names
start with A”, and the second query reads as “list everything
on contact table”. However, if this query runs on a table
where there is only one contact whose name is Alice. Thus,
SQL queries are also open to varying interpretations. Conse-
quently, it is crucial to have a SQL query extraction strategy
according to why these features are required. For instance,
query recommendation requires analysis of feature correlation
and dependency [18], while performance optimization requires
discovery of table joins [21].
As discussed before, we observe and process every SQL
query issued to the DBMS. We extract the relevant features
of the query considering which part of the database the
user is accessing with that particular query. In our previos
work [22], we investigated the query clustering quality of
several query feature extraction methods. Our work follows
the basic principles of the two most commonly used SQL
query feature extraction methods [21], [23].
Aligon et al. [21] survey on comparing OLAP sessions
considering the query similarity, and session similarity. They
classify selection and join attributes as the most relevant
component in a query followed by the group-by attributes.
With the light of the findings, they propose their own SQL
query extraction schema which considers projection, group-
by, selection and join attributes for queries issued on OLAP
datacubes. Makiyama et al. [23] focus on workload exploration
on large query logs. They extract the attributes in selection,
join, projection, from, group-by and order-by items separately,
and record their appearance frequency. We approach query
feature extraction with the goal of understanding which part
of the database the query writer is interested in. We extract
the terms in selection, joins, projection, group-by, and order-
by items along with constants and parameters in the query
separately, and record their appearance frequency.
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B. Normal Behavior
Users access information on the database through interact-
ing with the app. The app generates queries based on the
activities performed, and retrieve data from the database with
these queries.
Building user profiles through clustering, and other ma-
chine learning techniques has been studied extensively in the
literature before [7], [20], [24]. However, this approach is
not suitable to make the user profiles adapt to the behavior
changes, or to allow the anomaly detection strategy to consider
a possible behavior shift. They usually take a snapshot of all
the activity at a certain time, and create a model based on
the information available at that point of time without even
considering the activity time. Since the query set is clustered
with an uncertain number of labels, it is required to compute
a pairwise distance matrix between queries to perform a
clustering with hierarchical clustering or a similar clustering
method. This operation has quadratic complexity [25], and is
required to be performed over the whole set of queries. When
the model starts to perform worse, the re-training of the model
requires the same operation to be repeated.
We focus on observing behavior in individual profiles to
show the importance of behavior drift. For each user, we define
a user profile for a given timeframe T , denoted as the vector
φTu ∈ Rd, where d is the total number of features extracted
using the methodology given in Section III-A. To compute φTu ,
we consider all queries issues by the user u to the database
within the timeframe T . A query issued at time t, is a d length
vector of counts, and is denoted as qtu, where the i
th element,
qtu[i], is equal to the number of times the feature i is observed
in the corresponding query.
Note that the feature extraction from a query is an O(d) time
complexity operation where d is a relatively small number,
compared to the number of queries.
By combining the feature counts across all queries issued by
the user u in a given timeframe, one can compute the entries
in the user profile vector, φTu , as follows:
φTu [i] =
∑
∀t∈T q
t
u[i]∑d
j=1
∑
∀t∈T qtu[j]
(1)
The user profiles are created with the accumulation of these
features for a given period of time. Using the appearance
frequency of these features, we calculate the appearance
probability of each harvested feature. One can also consider
the user profile for timeframe T , as a multinomial random
variable, which can take one out of d possible values, with
probability distribution parameterized by φTu .
Given that the features are stored in a map structure, the
features of a new query can be simply added to the feature
counters which are used to compute the probability of a
feature. Hence, this operation has only O(1) time complexity.
Logically, we expect the preprogrammed queries to be more
consistent between each other, while handwritten queries to
form a more diverse distribution. For instance, DBAs and
data analysts access a variety of data as required by their
jobs. However, apps generate queries based on the data access
layer’s query generation strategy with parameters provided by
the methods that use the data access layer. Sometimes, queries
can even be hardcoded into the app source code. Therefore,
query diversity is expected to be lower than handwritten
queries. As a result, we define this expected change in behavior
with the term profile drift.
Comparison of the accumulated user profile, for timespan
T1, with the new incoming behavior observed for timespan T2,
using Kullback–Leibler Divergence [26] gives the drift score
denoted as follows:
dT2u (φ
T2
u ||φT1u ) =
∑
i
φT1u (i)log2
φT1u (i)
φT2u (i)
(2)
KL-Divergence (i.e., relative entropy) is used for com-
paring two probability distributions, P and Q; and it ranges
between 0 and ∞. DKL(P ||Q) essentially represents the
information loss when Q distribution is used to approximate
P .
Note that when P (i) 6= 0 and Q(i) = 0, DKL(P ||Q) =∞.
For example, suppose, we have two distributions P and Q as
follows: P = {f0 : 3/10, f1 : 4/10, f2 : 2/10, f3 : 1/10} and
Q = {f0 : 3/10, f1 : 3/10, f2 : 3/10, f4 : 1/10}. In this case,
since f3 is not a part of Q, the result would be ∞, which
means these two distributions are completely different.
Smoothing. To get past this problem, we can apply smooth-
ing (i.e., Laplace/additive smoothing), which is essentially
adding a small constant epsilon to the distribution, to handle
zero values, without significantly impacting the distribution.
After we apply smoothing, DKL(P ||Q) becomes 1.38.
The intuition behind using KL-Divergence in our method
is to identify the change we experience in the newly coming
behavior, compared to the base profile. Similarly, the intuition
behind using smoothing is to assume that even if a feature
has not been seen in the given dataset, we can still take into
account the possibility of its appearance, although very small.
Without smoothing, distributions with thousands of matching
features except one could be regarded as not related.
C. Anomalous Behavior
The user profile evaluates as the new features from the
newly coming behavior are imported to the profile. However,
before they are added to the profile, they are tested to see if
this new activity is an anomalous behavior.
The drift scores over time, which form a vector denoted as
DS, are used to calculate the linear regression coefficients to
see the ordinary behavior change for the user. The resulting
model function of linear regression of these drift scores for
a given period of time yields the profile drift, formulated as
follows:
DˆSi = βˆ0 + βˆ1ti + ˆi (3)
where βˆ0 is the y-axis intercept constant, and βˆ1 is the
slope of the profile drift line. ˆi is a very small number that
represents the noise.
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To compute βˆ, given a matrix C×N , the naive least squares
computation has overall O(C2N) complexity, or we can use
LU or Cholesky decomposition which takes O(C3) where C
denotes the number of features and N denotes the number
of training examples. Since we can usually assume N > C,
O(C2N) dominates O(C3). As a result we can consider
that the total asymptotic complexity for linear regression is
O(C2N). However, since we are using the KL-Divergence
score of two probability distributions, the number of features
scales down to 1, which results in the complexity of this step
scaling down to O(C2) where C is expected to be a very low
number by computational standards. For instance, if we take
the profile drift computation interval as one day, we end up
with C = 365 for a year of data.
Profile drifts occur as the users take on different tasks, as
they start to grow different interests, or as they gain experience
on the job. Consequently, when this constant change is not
addressed properly, utilizing a predefined threshold value can
lead to raising too many false positives for the security
personnel to inspect when it is set too low, or too many
false negatives when it is set too high to avoid false positives.
Hence, we define an anomaly as a drift score larger than the
sum of the expected profile drift at that specific point, and
expected error (i.e., standard deviation) as follows:
func(φT2u ) =
{
raisealarm, if dT2u > DˆSi + σDS
normalbehavior, otherwise
(4)
Positive drift in a profile implies that the user is inclined
to change their behavior rapidly. Negative drift at any point
intuitively suggests that the user started not to get out of their
usual pattern as much as before. Issuing no queries at all does
not cause any security concerns while increasing the sensitivity
to behavior drift when the user starts to issue queries again.
When a system uses our model, by using a sliding window
strategy, this high sensitivity will fade away as the behavior
drift will converge in time.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first describe our experimental setup and
the dataset. We then show how behavior drift can identify
different users. We finally present findings from the evaluation
of our framework with a real-world SQL query workload.
A. Experimental Setup
In our experiments, the tests were performed on macOS
High Sierra v11.0.1 on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 with 8GB
memory. All of the implementations are performed with Java
1.8 and Python 3.5.
B. Dataset
We use Android smartphone query SQL query logs in our
experiments. The experiment dataset consists of SQL logs that
capture all database activities of 11 Android phones for a
period of one month. SQL queries collected are anonymized,
and some of the identified query constraints are deleted for
TABLE I: Dataset
Application # of queries
Complete Dataset 45,090,798
Facebook 1,272,779
Google+ 2,040,793
Google Play 14,813,949
IRB compliance. In this dataset, the queries are generated
by the Android applications. There are 45,090,798 queries
in total in this dataset. We selected three apps that have the
largest volume of database interactions for our experiments:
(1) Facebook, (2) Google+, and (3) Google Play.
We also performed the same experiments on smaller, less
used applications, that reflected similar results 1. The total
query numbers for each application can be seen in Table I.
Not all queries issued by Android apps are legitimate SQL –
there can be stored procedure calls, and environment variable
checks. The SQL query logs of Facebook, Google+ and
Google Play we used for our experiments are extracted from
PocketData dataset [27] and available online 2.
C. User Similarity
This experiment aims to show that even though the app
generates the queries with the same logic, user behavior affects
the distribution of queries. We investigate how similar the users
profiles are to each other in this experiment.
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Fig. 4: Intra-Application user behavior difference for different
Android applications
Figure 4 shows how comparable different users are with re-
gards to their information access characteristics. In the graphs,
darker colors represent that the corresponding user behavior is
more distinct while lighter colors represents that the users have
similar behaviors. Also note that the color scale is different
for each application. We observe that usage characteristics of
1Disclaimer: We do not claim that the apps selected for the experiments
have any vulnerabilities that is presented in this work. This does not mean
they do not have similar vulnerabilities that can cause data leakage.
2https://phone-lab.org/experiment/request/
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Google Play Services are less diverse between users, whereas
social media application usage characteristics of users are very
distinguishable. Based on Figure 4, although the workloads
created by different users share the same queries, the distribu-
tion of the queries are different. Hence, we conclude that our
method can distinguish workloads created by different users.
D. Per-User Behavior Model
In this section, we report our findings on employing our
approach of creating user behavior models for each app.
Figure 5 shows how user behavior changes over time on
the left side, and profile drift of each user on the right side
for different Android applications. The x-axis represents the
day of the month, the y-axis represents the drift score for the
user for that specific day compared to the aggregation of all
activity in the previous days.
QWA allows its users to investigate reasons of the behavior
changes by summarizing the features that caused the highest
drift score change. This allows us to quickly inspect the
information accessed when an alarm is raised. The trend line
for each user represents the observed behavior drift, namely,
how fast the behaviors of the user change. Less area under the
trend line means the user is less inclined to change their daily
routines.
In our dataset, There are 4 users who used Facebook app,
and except one, the users have stable profiles. One user, on the
other hand, seems to have a distinguishable behavior change
over time. However, when inspected, that specific user only
uses the application more than 3 minutes twice, which explains
the spikes seen in Figure 5a.
Similarly, except one user, all the users of Google+ appli-
cation have steady behaviors. Most of the queries issued by
Google+ app retrieve information on the user’s account, which
clearly shows how Android OS utilizes the Google+ applica-
tion. Figure 5b, on the other hand, reveals that this application
is mostly affected by the phone usage characteristics.
Google Play Services is an Android system-support app.
The drift over time, as shown in Figure 5c, is low for most
of the users. This application controls the install, update, and
delete application operations on behalf of the operating system.
The inspection we performed shows that the user who has
a distinguishing behavior drift is used to install, and delete
various applications.
One misconception from Figure 5 can be that similar trends
in these graphs mean these users have analogous behavioral
characteristics. Similar trends in these graphs only mean that
the expectation of behavior change pace is comparable for
these users.
In the following section, we will describe the red-teaming
approach we used to inject real workloads. Since these work-
loads were taken from the other users, the variety between
users are directly correlated to the success of the experiments.
E. Red-teaming approach
We consider two different attack frameworks: (1) Simulated
query attack injection, in which we prepare specific attack
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Fig. 5: User behavior change and profile drift for different
Android applications
scenarios for each app, and (2) Real workload injection, in
which we input other users’ real workloads into the user’s
own workload.
From now on, we will call the actual workload owner the
victim, and the owner of the injected workload the adversary.
Simulated workload injection. We inject specifically de-
signed workloads to perform a malicious activity into the user
workload. We assume that all the actual query activity in the
dataset is benign. Note that we inject the simulated workloads
into the log, not into the actual smartphone databases.
This approach addresses free-styler and the first case of
translator attack models described in Section II:
• When a new workload consisting of queries that are not
generated by the app’s own query generator in addition to
the benign workload is injected and run, it would equate
to a free-styler attack since normally the app wouldn’t
produce these queries therefore not letting the victim the
privilege to access the information.
• In translator attack model, the malicious code modifies
the query generation mechanism code of the app. The
queries can still be generated by the app, but some
of them will not reflect the same characteristics as the
legitimate queries.
The simulated queries we injected in the victim’s workload
are prepared according to the scenarios given below:
Facebook We delete entries in the feed table and correspond-
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TABLE II: Detection rates for profile drift using simulated
workload injection
# of Attacks
Performed
# of Attacks
Detected
Detection
Rate
Facebook 105 98 93.3%
Google+ 225 214 95.1%
Google Play 282 267 94.7%
TABLE III: Detection rates for profile drift using real workload
injection
# of Attacks
Performed
# of Attacks
Detected
Detection
Rate
Facebook 315 283 89.8%
Google+ 2025 1818 89.7%
Google Play 2583 2092 81.0%
ing cache items. To replace them, we insert other feed
items that we want the victim to believe.
Google+ We access the account information and the photos
stored on the account. We alter the account information
in order to redirect the password renewal emails to us.
Google Play Services We modify the log records in order
to confuse the operating system to skip updates for
some applications. This would allow an adversary to take
advantage of any patched vulnerabilities.
The results for this approach are given in Table II.
Real workload injection. We inject different workloads
created by other users into the normal workload of the user.
We assume that all the query activity in the dataset is benign.
However, we simulate an attack by injecting one user’s normal
activity into the workload created by one of the other users.
Hence, we only use queries that were created by the app itself.
This approach addresses the copycat and the second case of
the translator attack models described in Section II:
• By injecting the adversary’s workload, we simulate copy-
cat attack. The adversary’s workload would reflect its the
characteristics of queries generated by legitimate actions
while using the victim’s credentials.
• The second case of the translator attack similarly uses
legitimate queries generated by the app, however, these
queries are being generated by the modified code.
The results for this approach are given in Table III.
In our experiments, we created the normal user behavior
model for each user. To compute detection accuracy rate, we
partitioned the workloads of the same application created by
all the other users day by day, and we tested each of these
partitions of data to see if our system raises an alarm on the
specific normal user behavior model that is being tested. As
mentioned in Section IV-E, although these injected workloads
are actually naive workloads of other users, in our concept,
they belong to a different user but still generated legitimately;
hence, they represent an extremely skillful attacker. As shown
in Table III, our methodology successfully determines these
injections do not belong to the user model at least 81% and
at most 89.8% of the times depending on the application.
V. RELATED WORK
There are two approaches to deal with data leakage from
databases: (1) misuse detection, and (2) anomaly detection.
Misuse detection aims to collect a dataset of events that
leads to intrusions. These systems observe user behavior, and
when a user takes certain actions, the system either raises an
alarm, or blocks the user from taking any other actions. These
particular actions can be designed for specific scenarios to
prevent well-known attacks, or they can be learned from other
sources such as successfully caught incidents [28].
Anomaly detection approach, on the other hand, depends
on detecting anomalies at a user’s behavior. The systems
implemented with these approach can focus on a specific
type of resource, or combination of resources [29] such as
file access patterns [30], shell commands [31], and SQL
queries [7], [20], [32].
There has been extensive level of research in detecting
data leakage from databases, but there are still challenges
in this field [33]. Chung et al. [34] proposed the use of
access patterns to databases to detect typical behavior of users.
Kamra et al. [7] developed a SQL query feature extraction
method that generalizes complex queries into simpler, and
easier to compare forms to use them in detecting insider
attacks. Mathew et al. [20] introduced a data–centric approach
that requires access to the data that a query returns, which
then would be used to compute the overlap between returned
result sets. Wang et al. [24] focused on harvesting attacks
considering query correlation and result coverage. Maggi et
al. [8] is one of the leading works that introduced concept
drift in web applications. Their model is designed to track the
changes on websites in order to find out if there is a need to
retrain the security application.
We use a temporal user behavior drift model in user profiles
in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first work that performs such an extensive study on SQL query
data produced by real world users on temporal behavior drift.
Although using temporal concept drift for outlier detection has
been studied in a limited number of works before as pointed
out, we believe these studies either did not use or create real-
world user provided activities, or they used generated data. Our
approach takes adaptation to individual behaviors into account
which would allow flexibility to adapt to new tasks.
VI. DISCUSSION
There are a number of vulnerabilities that have been iden-
tified on Android OS which can lead to sensitive data leakage
from the app database. In this paper, we discuss two of them,
and argue that there may be other vulnerabilities with similar
consequences that have not been discovered yet. The solution
proposed in this paper is applicable to detect attacks that
exploit these vulnerabilities. However, this method requires
prior knowledge about how the user utilizes an app. Therefore,
zero-day attacks cannot be detected with the proposed method.
To address this problem, developers can insert probability
distributions for different classes of users in the alpha tests
of their app, so that the security layer that utilizes our method
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can collect enough data about the user, and still be able to
detect zero day attacks.
In our experiments, we take the profile drift computation
interval as one day, and we compare this distribution with the
accumulated user profile over time. Although this approach
achieves high detection rates in our setting, applying a sliding
window on the streaming data to create the user profile can
yield better results for different apps. The ideal length of the
interval and sliding window depends on different settings.
Lastly, in this paper, we only propose a method to detect
data leakage from databases on Android apps. We do not
propose a strategy on how the app reacts when an attack is
detected. We believe that this decision should be made by the
app developer, and it is out of our scope.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper was to highlight a class of vul-
nerabilities that can lead to data leakage from the database
system, and to present a framework for creating user behavior
profiles considering the temporal behavior drift to be used in
detecting attacks exploiting them. We first provided a user
behavior model for data leakage prevention. We argued that
without considering the constant change in people’s behaviors
and habits, it is impossible for the defense systems to adapt to
the new changes. This would result in the need for retraining
of the user models for the system. In our experiments, we
used real world query workloads and applied two different
red teaming approaches: (1) simulated attack workloads, and
(2) injection of benign real world workloads of other users.
The model we described in this paper constitutes the first
steps of building a temporal behavior drift prediction model.
Concretely, we plan to extend our work in several directions:
First, we will analyze other regression models, and test their
effect on the performance of the system. Second, we will
incorporate a prediction model both for security applications,
and performance optimization of database systems. Lastly, we
will develop a production ready package to be integrated to
apps and Android OS.
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